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Murphy: Rule 11 and the Constitutional Requirements for Guilty Pleas

RULE 11 AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR GUILTY PLEAS
INTRODUCTION

The guilty plea has long been recognized as a material
ingredient of the American system of criminal justice.' Its
A
importance is twofold-quantitative2 and qualitative
Presidential Commission in 1967 reported that almost 85% of
all convictions were attained through guilty pleas.' This massive quantity of guilty pleas gives rise to their qualitative effect upon criminal administration. Cases in which guilty pleas
are entered are quickly disposed of, avoid the time, expense,
and uncertainty of trials, and free the overburdened courts to
attend to other duties.' The volume of guilty pleas, however,
gives rise to a negative effect upon the administration of criminal justice. Too often guilty pleas are entered by defendants
without knowledge of their courtroom rights and realization
of the consequences of a guilty plea. The negative effect is
caused by judges who hastily and perfunctorily accept such
pleas.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in pursuit of
their general objective of a "just determination of every
criminal proceeding ...

simplicity in procedure, fairness in

administration and elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay,"' provide a standard by which federal judges may analyze guilty pleas and accept or reject them accordingly.7 Rule
118 requires four elements: that" [1] the plea is made voluntarily [2] with understanding of the nature of the charge and
[3] the consequences of the plea [and that] [4] there is a facCopyright @ 1971 by the University of Wyoming
1. See, e.g., ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 297 (1947).
2. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE at
1-2 (1968 Approved Draft); NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF
GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 1 (1966); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS 134-35 (1967).
8. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOP. CRIMINAL JUSTICE at
2-5 (1968 Approved Draft) ; NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 2-6.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 135 (1967).
5. NEWMAN, aupra note 2, at 29.
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 2.
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Wyoming substantially adopted the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure on Nov. 21, 1968, effective Feb. 11, 1969. For purposes
of simplicity the Federal Rules will hereinafter be referred to instead of
the Wyoming Rules.
8. The corresponding section in the Wyoming Rules is Rule 15.
4.
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tual basis for the plea." 9 A 1966 amendment to the Federal
Rules"° added a fifth element: that the court make the determination of voluntariness and understanding by personally addressing the defendant. Rule 11, then, serves a prophylactic
function as a guard against acceptance of guilty pleas that are
either coerced or unintelligently entered. Wyoming has substantially adopted all of the Federal Rules.1 1 Most states have
not, and as a consequence there is little uniformity in the guilty
plea process. This lack of uniformity, however, does not excuse any court from meeting the demands of due process in the
fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.
The purpose of this article will be to explore the language
and rulings of the United States Supreme Court and demonstrate how this Court has substantially incorporated the elements of Rule 11 into the due process requirement, so that
Rule 11 is now constitutionally binding upon the states. Particular attention will be rendered Boykin v. Alabama 2 which
incorporated the requirement that a court personally address
a defendant who wishes to plead guilty as a method for determining whether the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly. The article will then address itself to the question
of Boykin's retroactivity. An appendix will follow this article
suggesting particular areas in which a judge should make inquiries of a defendant who wishes to enter a plea of guilty.
THE REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARINESS AND UNDERSTANDING

It is certain that the Supreme Court has long demanded
that guilty pleas be voluntarily and intelligently made.'" Until
Boykin this was all that the Court required. Consequently,
trial judges had much discretion and control over the guilty
plea process. 4 The Supreme Court has never placed its imprimatur upon any particular set of inquiries which will determine voluntariness and understanding. The guilty plea
pro9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. The requirement that there be a factual basis for
the plea was added by a 1966 amendment to the Federal Rules.
10. The Wyoming Rules include the 1966 amendment to the Federal Rules. See
note 9 supra.

11. See note 7 supra.
12. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
13. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164 (1970); Von Moltke
v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 719 (1948); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S.
220, 223-24 (1927) (dictum).
14. See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 235.
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cess does not lend itself to such certainty and absoluteness.
It is subject to the vagaries of each individual fact situation.
Even Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does
not designate the nature of the inquiry a judge should conduct. 5 The Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States"s
expressly recognized this lack of certainty when it stated:
"The nature of the inquiry required by Rule 11 must necessarily vary from case to case, and therefore, we do not establish
any general guidelines other than those expressed in the Rule
itself."" The case by case method referred to in McCarthy is
the formula of the Court has applied in reviewing guilty pleas.
Mr. Justice Butler's oft-quoted utterances in Kercheval
v. United States 8 are indicative of the Court's continuing
concern with guilty pleas. Justice Butler equated the guilty
plea to an outright conviction and then stated that "[o]ut of
just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are
careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made
voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding
of the consequences." 1 9 Although the validity of a guilty plea
was not directly in issue,2" Kercheval provided the prefatory
remarks for a long line of cases which established the Supreme
Court's surveillance over the guilty plea process. In these
cases the Court always separated the voluntariness issue from
the question of understanding.
When the Court has been concernd with the issue of voluntariness, the fact situations both before and during the
arraignment have usually been the focal points upon which the
decisions turned. In Waley v. Johnston" the Supreme Court
was moved by an allegation that an F.B.I. agent threatened to
publicize false statements and evidence which would so incite
the community that the death sentence would be a foregone
15. Id. at 11.
16. 394 U.S. 459 (1969). The basis of the McCarthy decision was the Court's
supervisory power over the application of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure by lower federal courts. Constitutional issues were expressly
disregarded.
17. Id. n. 20.
18. 274 U.S. 220 (1927). The case was not concerned directly with the validity
of a guilty plea. The only issue was whether a withdrawn guilty plea is
admissible in the subsequent trial.
19. Id. at 223.
20. Kerchical was only indirectly concerned with guilty pleas, holding that withdrawn guilty pleas are not admissible as evidence of guilt in the subsequent
trial.
21. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
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conclusion if the case ever went to trail. The Court granted
the petitioner an evidentiary hearing. In Machibroda v.
United States" the petitioner was awarded a hearing upon his
contentions that an Assistant United States Attorney's promises of leniency and threats of prosecution on other charges
had induced his guilty plea. Jackson v. United States" stands
for the proposition that statutes which needlessly encourage
guilty pleas are wanting in due process. By 1970 the Court
was ready to declare a test by which voluntariness could be
determined. In Brady v. United States 4 Judge Tuttle of the
Fifth Circuit was quoted as properly stating the test: a plea
is voluntary if made with an awareness of the direct consequences and the value of any promise of leniency and not induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises."
Brady is significant because it expressly approves plea bargaining as proper and does not render bargained guilty pleas
involuntary per se. Brady further upholds guilty pleas made
to charges which are brought pursuant to statutes disallowing
the death sentence only when the defendant pleads guilty.
Such statutes, the Court declared, do not on their face make
an otherwise voluntary guilty plea involuntary.26 It is apparent, however, that the Brady test does not aid the trial judge
in deciphering the subjective state of the defendant's mind
in order to determine voluntariness.
The Supreme Court has been even less helpful to trial
judges in their metaphysical quest for a defendant's understanding of a guilty plea. The Court has framed the requisite
of understanding in terms of a knowledge of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.2 Von Moltke v Gillies2" set out the most definitive test of such understanding:
(1) knowledge of the nature of the charge, (2) the statutory
offenses within the charge, (3) the range of allowable punishments, (4) recognized defenses to the charge, (5) circumstances in mitigation, and (6) all other facts that are essential
368 U.S. 487 (1962).
390 U.S. 570 (1968).
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
Id. at 755.
Id. at 745-47. This is so even though a portion of the statute may unconstitutionally encourage guilty pleas as in Jackson v. United States, supra
note 22.
27. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, supra note 23, at 756; Pennsylvania ex Tel
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1956); Smith v. O'Grady, 312
U.S. 329, 334 (1941).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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to an understanding of the matter.2" The Von Moltke test does
not offer sufficient guidelines to a trial court since "all other
facts that are essential to an understanding of the matter"
covers a very broad territory.
If Brady and Von Moltke represent the most definitive
tests of voluntariness and understanding, trial judges' discretion and control over the gutliy plea process is intact. The
only thing that is clear, is that three elements of Rule 11-voluntariness of the plea, understanding the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea-are incorporated into the
due process requirement. It was not until Boykin that the
Supreme Court provided a method for judges to determine
voluntariness and understanding and to consequently avert
many post-conviction attacks upon arraignment proceedings.
THE B O XIN METHODS

The Boykin decision presents many problems, most of
which are probably the result of the cryptic style in which it
is written. One thing is certain after Boykin, a court may
not accept a guilty plea unless there is an "affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary."2 9 The Supreme
Court stated that the requirement of an affirmative showing
is fulfilled when the record of the arraignment discloses voluntariness and understanding. Edward Boykin's conviction
after his plea of guilty was reversed because there was no
such disclosure upon the record. The effectiveness of such a
requirement standing by itself is questionable since a complete record will not necessarily unveil coercion, threats, improper promises, or even a defendant's personal understanding.
The potential ineffectiveness of a complete record raises
the question whether this is all that Boykin demands. One
possible interpretation of Boykin is that the trial judge must
personally address the defendant to determine voluntariness
28. 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948). The petitioner in this case waived her right to
counsel and pleaded guilty. The Court held that petitioner could not have
waived her right to counsel unless she understood the nature of the charge
and the consequences of her plea. The test was applied in this instance to
determine whether she knowingly waived counsel.
29. 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
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and understanding-" There is language in the Court's decision to support such an interpretation:
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which
courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequences. 1
(emphasis added)
Taken in context, however, this language could be considered
as a mere recommendation of a means to develop a full and
complete record.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for viewing this language
as a constitutional ruling, demanding that trial courts develop
the arraignment record by personally addressing the defendant. McCarthy held that it was reversible error for the trial
judge to neglect this personal interrogation and that the petitioner should be allowed to plead anew.32 The Court in McCarthy, however, expressly did not reach any constitutional
issues, but based the decision on its supervisory power over
The Court expressed two major
federal court procedures.3
reasons for its holding: (1) a personal interrogation of the
defendant assists trial judges in ascertaining the voluntariness and understanding of the plea, and (2) helps the judge
develop a complete record that will discourage unfounded
post-conviction attacks and expedite authentic ones. 4 The
Boykin decision expressed these same two policy factors following its statement that a court should "canvass the matter
with the accused". 5 The similarity of the language,"6 policy,
and reasoning in the two decisions may be illustrative of a
single holding applicable to federal courts in McCarthy and
state courts in Boykin.
30. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 254 A.2d 923, 924 (1969);
State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 550 (Ia. 1969) ; Peterson, A Checklist for
Arraignments, Pleas and eSntencings, 9 TRIAL JUDGES' J. 49, 50 (1970);
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 183-84 (1969).
31. 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
32. 394 U.S. 459, 472 (1969).
33. Id. at 464.
34. Id. at 465-67.
35. 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
36. Comment, Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty
Pleas, 48 N.C. L. Rav. 352, 357-58 (1969).
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The complete record that Boykin assuredly demands 7
can only be developed by inquiries made of either the defendant or his attorney. The Court in Boykin at least hinted
that the petitioner's attorney at the arraignment had performed inadequately when it noted in its opinion that Edward
Boykin's attorney engaged only in cursory cross-examination
of alleged eyewitnesses and did not present testimony of Mr.
Boykin's character when there was no indication that he had
a prior criminal record. 8 Additionally Boykin pleaded guilty
to a capital offense despite the fact there could have been no
bargained-for reduction of sentence. The sentence in Alabama
is determined by a separate jury whenever a defendant pleads
guilty." The Supreme Court noted that a guilty plea may be
desirable as a matter of trial strategy, but that the record was
silent in this regard." It is hard to imagine a plea of guilty to
a capital offense as being any strategy at all. Perhaps the
Court, then, recognized a need for proof of the adequacy of
counsel in the guilty plea process. If so, it would be a recognition that defendants who plead guilty are sometimes represented by court-appointed counsel who do not always treat the
interests of such defendants as being foremost." This proof
of a competently advised defendant can only be sustained by
a personal inquiry of the defendant concerning all the advice
his attorney has provided. If this was the Court's thinking,
their statement that the trial court should" canvass the matter
with the accused" was an affirmative holding and not mere
dictum. Such a ruling would certainly be more likely to confirm the voluntariness of a plea and a defendant's understanding. In bypassing counsel and addressing the defendant
a trial court would have a fully developed record which would
more easily survive collateral attack. Thus, the two policy
factors set out in McCarthy and Boykin would be attained.
Furthermore, such an inquiry would rebut any post-conviction
allegation of incompetency of counsel. At the arraignment
37. See generally Brady v. United States, supra note 23, at n. 20. This footnote

38.
39.
40.
41.

to the Brady decision states that the new element added by Boykin is a
complete record. A negative inference might be drawn from this. The
inference may be that this is all that Boykin demands and that a personal
interrogation of the defendant is not an element added by Boykin.
395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969).
ALA. CODE tit. 15 § 277 (1958); see Boykin v. Alabama, id. at 240; The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 187 (1969).
395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969).
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 187 (1969).
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the trial judge would be either testing the adequacy of a
defendant's counsel or be providing his own legal advice to a
defendant who had properly waived his right to counsel.4
Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice Black joined
in a dissenting opinion, interpreted the Boykin decision as
making Rule 11 of the Federal Rules a constitutional mandate
upon the states." Prior to Boykin only two elements of Rule
11 were not yet incorporated into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Of these two, only the requirement
that a court personally address the defendant was discussed
in Boyikn. The only conclusion is that Justices Harlan and
Black considered the Boykin majority to have constitutionally
required a judge to personally address a defendant to ascertain the voluntariness and understanding of his guilty plea.
Moreover, the dissenters discussed the McCarthy decision in
such a way as to equate it with Boy kin.
Besides incorporating another element of Rule 11 into the
constitutional requirements of due process, Boykin has additional significance. Both Boykin and McCarthy recognized
that inherent in a guilty plea is a waiver of three federal constitutional rights-the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, the right ti trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers.4
The Boykin opinion stated that a
waiver of these three rights cannot be presumed and must
appear in the record."5 If the proper interpretation of Boykin
requires the trial judge to ascertain the voluntariness of the
plea and the understanding of the defendant by personally
addressing him, the waiver of these three rights, which is a
consequence of the guilty plea and thus directly related to a
defendant's understanding, must come from the lips of the
defendant.
Boykin can easily be dismissed as a particularly appealing fact situation-a poor black man, charged in an Alabama
court with five separate counts of common law robbery, who
pleaded guilty to these five capital offenses upon the advice
42. A defendant has a right to counsel at an arraignment proceeding regardless
of his plea. Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra note 13, at 723.
43. 395 U.S. 238, 245 (1969).
44. Id. at 243; 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
45. "We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from
4 silent record," 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
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of his attorney and was sentenced to die on each count. Nevertheless, Boykin should be viewed positively as representing a
constitutionally mandated method whereby a trial court can
more easily determine voluntariness and understanding. The
method, however, is undermined if trial courts either no not interpret the decision as demanding personal inquiries to be
made of the defendant or completely dismiss Boykin as a Supreme Court reaction to precipitant justice. Even an interpretation that Boykin demands only an affirmative arraignment
record is nonsensical if not combined with the requirement of
a personal exchange between judge and defendant. Boykin,
then, should be viewed as an incorporation of one more element
of Rule 11 into the requisites of due process of law and an addition of the waiver of the three constitutional rights to those
things which constitute consequences of a guilty plea.
It is noteworthy that Boykin was an outright reversal
of the petitioner's conviction. The Court did not intervene
by merely granting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his plea was voluntarily and understandingly made. Instead the remedy was more extreme with the effect that
Alabama would have to bring new charges against Boykin.
This should be ominous to trial courts. All they must do is
determine the validity of a guilty plea by personally addressing the defendant in something more than a mere ritualistic
and mechanical manner. Appellate courts will then be less
inclined to command prosecutors to initiate new arraignment
proceedings after evidence has grown stale and memories
have become foggy with the passing of time.
LIMITED RETROACTIVE

APPLICATION

OF BOYKIN

When the Supreme Court interprets a federal procedural
rule, the application of the holding is restricted to federal
courts. This was the situation in McCarthy. Halliday v.
United States4 was the sequel to McCarthy and determined
the extent of the prior case's retroactivity. The Court ruled
in Halliday that McCarthy's retroactivity was limited only to
that particiular case and would not vitiate any guilty plea
which was accepted prior to the decision in McCarthy. Halli46. 394 U.S. 831 (1969).
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day, although it was a ruling upon the applicability of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, will probably serve
as authority for deciding any case which seeks to apply Boykin only to guilty pleas accepted after that case was decided.
Certain language in Halliday is illustrative of the Court's
utilization of constitutional standards to determine McCarthy's retroactivity." Consequently, the same factors that determined Halliday would probably be accepted in applying
Boykin only to those guilty pleas which were accepted after
that decision. The Halliday decision turned on many factors:
applying McCarthy only to guilty pleas accepted after the
decision does not deprive defendants of any other postconviction remedies, reliance upon the old standard for accepting guilty pleas was pervasive, and many valid convictions
were based upon guilty pleas without complete compliance
with Rule 11 prior to McCarthy." The same factors would
most likely apply Boykin only to guilty pleas accepted after
the decision, " notwithstanding the fact that other constitutionally commanded rules of criminal procedure have been
applied retroactively."
RULE 11i's FACTUAL BASIS REQUIREMENT

Rule 11 requires federal judges to be satisfied that there
is a factual basis for a plea of guilty. It is significant that
this requirement applies only to guilty pleas and not to pleas
of nolo contendre. The Advisory Committee on Criminal
Rules stated that the factual basis may be determined by
"inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the government,
or by examining the presentence report, or otherwise, that the
conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense
charged in the indictment" 5 1 (emphasis added). This statement gives a court alternative means of satisfying itself that
there is a factual basis for the plea. The Advisory Committee
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

"1[]t

is appropriate to analyze . . . that decision's retroactively in terms
of the same criteria we have employed to determine whether constitutionally grounded decisions that depart from precedent should be applied retroactively." Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
See, e.g., Moss v. Craven, 427 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Del Piano v.
United States, 427 F.2d 1156, 1157 (3rd Cir. 1970).
See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
2 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 11:73, at 147
(1966).
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further states that this portion of Rule 11 is designed to protect the defendant who does not realize his actions do not fall
within the charge."
Unlike the other elements of Rule 11, the factual basis
requirement has never been incorporated as a constitutional
prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea. The Supreme
Court indirectly considered this issue in Alford v. North Caro3 Instead of adopting this final element of Rule 11 as a
lina."
requirement of due process, the Court related the facts of
the Alford case to the constitutional requisite that a guilty
plea be intelligently entered. Henry Alford's plea of guilty
at the arraignment was accompanied by his own protestations
of innocence. In upholding Alford's conviction the Supreme
Court noted that a guilty plea ordinarily includes an admission by the defendant that he committed the acts which constitute the crime in the indictment. 4 The Court, however,
refused to label Alford's plea as being either a guilty plea or
a plea of nolo contendere and stated that any such distinction
was of no constitutional significance in the issue before it.
The Court then ruled that an express admission of guilt is
not constitutionally required in order to impose criminal
sanctions. 5
If the facts of the Alford case had arisen in a court which
was bound by Rule 11, the factual basis requirement would
have emerged as an issue. Even though Alford's assertions
of innocence negated any admission of guilt, a judge might
have been satisfied that there was a sufficient factual basis
for the plea by relying upon one of the alternative methods
for such a determination. The specific alternative methods set
out by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules are an
examination of the presentence report or inquiries made of the
attorney for the government." The State had a very strong
case against Alford. Its overwhelming evidence against the
defendant would be determinative of a factual basis. Furthermore, the factual basis requirement was not designed to
shield defendants like Alford. It was meant to protect the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).
Id. at 164.
Id. at 167.
2 ORFIELD, supra note 51.
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defendant who does not realize his actions do not fall within
the charge. 7 Alford realized that the acts he would not admit
were exactly those actions the charge alleged.
The Alford decision, however, presents a further problem,
i.e., whether an additional constitutional requirement is present when a defendant proposes to plead guilty without admitting his guilt. The language of the Court implied that something more is needed:
If Alford's statements were to be credited as
sincere assertions of his innocence, there obviously
existed a factual and legal dispute between him and
the State. Without more, it might be argued that
the conviction entered on his guilty plea was invalid,
since his assertion of innocence negatived any admission of guilt58 (emphasis added).
The Court seemed to suggest a strong prosecution case with
substantial evidence of guilt would supply the additional
requirement. The Court then related the abundance of the
prosecution's evidence against Alford to the ordinary proverbial constitutional requirement that a guilty plea be intelligently entered. 9 Such a relationship raises the question whether Boykin would consequently require that the State's
trenchant evidence affirmatively appear on the record of the
proceedings. The Alford decision did not answer this. A trial
judge might anticipate a holding which would require such a
record. A cautious judge, when encountered by a defendant
pleading guilty while asserting innocence, would spread upon
the record either the prosecutor's evidence or the presentence
report. If the same judge were also governed by Rule 11, he
would thereby not only avert constitutional problems but also
authenticate his use of a sanctioned method for determination
of a factual basis for the plea.
CONCLUSION

The Boykin decision culminated the Supreme Court's
substantial incorporation of Rule 11 into the due process commands of the fourteenth amendment. This injection of uni57. Id.
58. 91 S. Ct. 160, 165 (1970).
59. Id. at 167.
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fortuity into the guilty plea process, however, will not terminate post-conviction attacks upon the acceptance of guilty
pleas. There will be a continuing case by case development of
what facts are necessary to comprise voluntariness, what facts
constitute knowledge of the nature of the charge, and what
are the consequences of a guilty plea. This development will
continue because the Supreme Court refuses to paint itself
into a corner by announcing a specific set of inquiries to be
made of a defendant entering a guilty plea. The Court has
only provided methods by which the courts may more easily
satisfy themselves of the voluntariness of a plea and the understanding of the defendant.
The Supreme Court announced its faith in the guilty plea
process when it stated in the Brady opinion:
Our view... is based on our expectations that courts
will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there
is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of
the defendants' admissions that they committed the
crimes with which they are charged."
If American courts meet these expectations they will create
a more efficient and just guilty plea process, will free themselves from embarassing post-conviction attacks, and attain
the most sublime goal of criminal administration-- 'an accurate and fair separation of the guilty from the innocent.' '
MICHAEL R. MURPHY

APPENDIX
The inquiries that a court should make of a defendant
before accepting a guilty plea will necessarily vary with each
fact situation. Both the form and the substance of such inquiries should vary with the background and educational level
of a particular defendant. Regardless of the defendant's
background, however, a court should be assured of two factors:
(1) that its inquiries are not muddled in legalese, being framed
60. 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
61. NEWMAN, 8upra note 2, at 4.
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in a manner understandable to a layman, 2 and (2) that the
defendant has sufficient time to consider his plea in light of
the court's inquiries."
The following is a list of suggestions which a court should
consider in addressing a defendant to ascertain the voluntariness of a guilty plea and the defendant's understanding of
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. The
list assumes that the inquiries can only be satisfied by the defendant personally, regardless of whether he is represented by
counsel. Some of the elements of this list have been merely
suggested by secondary authorities or courts of very limited
authority. Others have been openly rejected by courts. Consequently, the absence of some of these inquiries will not necessarily render a guilty plea invalid. Nevertheless, compliance
with this list should assure a judge that the record will demonstrate a defendant's voluntariness and understanding to the
extent any record can do so. Furthermore, the list suggests
areas that are open for possible development and expansion
by the courts. Some of these elements may never be incorporated as requisites for a valid guilty plea. Courts, however,
should be aware of these elements in developing a more just
guilty plea process. Such awareness, morever, will aid courts
in anticipating decisions of appellate courts and will lessen
the sting of surprise in the event all these elements are eventually added to the requirements of a valid guilty plea.
1. A court should determine whether the plea was induced
by threats or promises of any nature.6
2. A judge should not enter into the plea bargaining process. 5 The court, however, should determine whether plea
discussions have taken place. The court should then spread
upon the record its statement that any plea bargaining resulting in a reduction of charges, dismissal of charges, or commit62. See, e.g., ABA

PROJECT ON

MINIMUM

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:

STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY at 26 (1968 Approved Draft).
See, e.g., id. at 21-25; NEWMAN, 8upra note 2, at 33-35.

63.
64. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, supra note 23, at 755.
65.

See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY at 71-73 (1968 Approved Draft);

ef. United States ex rel Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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ments for leniency in sentence is solely between the prosecutor
and defendant. 6
3. A court should determine whether the prosecutor has
made any promises of favor 7 or leniency of sentence to the
defendant. The court should then warn the defendant that
any such promise is not binding upon it nor upon any court
before which the defendant may appear in the future."8 To be
assured of a complete record, the judge should make such
warnings to the defendant regardless of allegations that no
promises have been made.
4. The court should dispel any notion that a guilty plea
implicitly or by its nature necessarily disposes a court to be
more lenient in applying a sentence.6
5. The judge should explain the elements of the offense to
the defendant so that he has an understanding of the law in
relation to the facts.7" Furthermore, the defendant should be
informed of any possible included offenses within the
charges. 7 '
6. The court must satisfy itself from an inquiry of the defendant, the prosecution's evidence, or the presentence report that there is a factual basis for the plea.72
7. The judge should be satisfied that the defendant is
aware of all possible defenses (e.g. unlawfully acquired evidence or confession, irregularities in arrest, insanity, selfdefense) .
66. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY at 71-76 (1968 Approved Draft).
67. E.g., a promise of early parole. Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th
Cir. 1968).
68. See Brady v. United States, supra note 23, at 755; ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF

GUILTY at 29-30 (1968 Approved Draft).
69. See 22 ALA. L. REV. 76, 86-87 (1969); but see Holland v. United States,
406 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1969).
70. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466-67, 471 (1969) ; Munich
v. United States, 337 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir. 1964); but see United States
v. Lowe, 367 F.2d 44, 45 (7th Cir. 1966).
71. McCarthy v. United States, id. at n. 20; Peterson, supra note 30, at 52.
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; 2 ORFIELD, supra note 51.
73. See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, supr a note 13, at 724; United States v.
Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1957); Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d
580, 582 (1oth Cir. 1949).
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8. The court should explain any circumstances in mitigation.74
9. The judge should briefly explain to the defendant that
he has a constitutional right to trial by jury. The defendant
should then be made aware of the significance of this right
(e.g., presumption of innocence, trial by peers, prosecution's
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's privilege not to testify, defendant's right to confront his accusers,
inadmissibility of wrongfully acquired evidence and confession, inadmissibility of prior convictions as probative of
guilt) ." The judge should next impress upon the defendant

that a guilty plea waives the right to trial by jury, the privilege
self-incrimination, and the right to face
against compulsory
76
one's accusers.

10. The court should, furthermore, inform the defendant that a plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defenses (e.g. unlawful searches and seizures, irregularities in
arrest, double jeopardy, any statute of limitations).""
11. The court should explain that a conviction may involve a loss of civic privileges in certain jurisdictions (e.g.
disenfranchisement, privilege to testify in civil proceedings)."
12. The court should inform the defendant of the range
of possible penalties."9 Included in this explanation should be
a warning that incarceration for separate offenses may run
consecutively."
13. The judge should warn the defendant of any limitations imposed by statute on suspended sentences, probation, or
eventual parole."
74. Von Moltke v. Gillies, id.; United States v. Lester, id.; Snell v. United
States, id.
75. Peterson, supra note 30, at 52.
76. Boykin v. Alabama, supra note 40, at 243; see McCarthy v. United States,
supa note 69 at 466-67.
77. See, e.g., Rice v. United States, 420 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1969); 2 ORFIELD,
supra note 53, § 11:44, at 114-16.
78. But see French v. United States, 408 F.2d 1027, 1028 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3rd Cir. 1963).
79. Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra note 13, at 724; see Burch v. United States,
359 F.2d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1966).
80. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY at 28 (1968 Approved Draft).
81. Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1964) ; but see United
States v. Caruso, 280 F. Supp. 371, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/15

16

Murphy: Rule 11 and the Constitutional Requirements for Guilty Pleas

1971

1971
COMMEN1,TS76

769

14. The court should explain any possible additional punishment that might be imposed upon the defendant as a result
of his status (e.g., longer sentences imposed upon youths than
upon adults,8 2 additional sentences for multiple offenders or
habitual criminals).88

82. E.g., Federal Youth Corrections Act 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5017; see, e.g., Combs
v. United States 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968); Pilkington v. United States,
315 F.2d 204, 208-9 (4th Cir. 1963).
83. See Hinton v. United States, 232 F.2d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1956); People v.
Schulman, 13 App. Div. 2d 441, 216 NYS 2d 998, 1000-1 (1961); ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS
LATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY at 27-28 (1968 Approved Draft).
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